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The United States, after the American
Civil War, took a different course, abandoning its maritime heritage and replacing it with a naval form of the militarism
that was gaining ground in Germany, the
other rising industrial power, by adopting the battle fleet theories of Mahan,
Luce, Fiske, and others. It was a turn that
served the Navy well for most of what
remained of the twentieth century, as the
service used its vastly superior material
resources to overwhelm its symmetrical
opponents. In the process, freedom of
the sea, particularly after 1945—the
period from which the authors draw
most of their examples—ceased to be
about trade, becoming rather about
the freedom of naval forces to go
where they needed to project power.
China presents a different challenge.
Germany, Japan, and Soviet Russia were
all economic autarkies; China is the
opposite. It now has the world’s secondlargest economy and is the largest trading power; it uses its growing navy as
just one of a set of political, diplomatic,
industrial, technological, informational,
and legal tools to advance its interests.
Kraska and Pedrozo have looked at the
legal challenge with a gimlet eye. They
have provided not only an invaluable description of the threat China
presents to the U.S. Navy but a guide
to legal ripostes to Chinese behavior
that can be implemented now. They
have written a handbook for action
and a historical justification that all
officials working on China must read.
Their analysis and the prescription it
generates must, however, be read in
context. Like Britain in Paris in 1856,
we need the vision, flexibility, and
guile to win all nations with maritime
interests over to our side. We need
to be their champion, as Woodrow
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Wilson purported to be in 1918, when
he made freedom of the seas one of his
Fourteen Points. More than that we
need to begin thinking and acting like a
maritime nation again. Maybe then we
can stay one step ahead of China at sea.
MARTIN N. MURPHY

Maritime Strategies for the XXI Century: The Contribution of Admiral Castex, by Lars Wedin. Paris:
Nuvis, 2016. 233 pages. $30.

It is a matter of interest when an author
is willing to break out some of the
older volumes on maritime strategy and
reexamine them in the light of current
concerns, attempting to determine
whether some nugget of interest has
been passed over inadvertently. Lars
Wedin’s Maritime Strategies for the XXI
Century: The Contribution of Admiral
Castex is such a work. Wedin examines
the writings of French admiral Raoul
Castex (1878–1968) for their applicability in creating maritime strategies for
the present millennium. This is not
an easy task. Castex was a voluminous
writer throughout his naval career,
authoring five books on strategic theory;
two additional volumes of collected
articles were compiled posthumously.
As a naval officer serving on escort
ships during the First World War,
Castex had the practical experience of
observing what actually worked—above
and beyond what any academician
might propose. Following that conflict,
Castex appreciated the opportunities
that technological advances in aircraft
and submarines might provide to the
future naval commander. Given his
lengthy naval career, wartime experience, and attentiveness to technological
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improvements, Castex should have been
a worthy successor to previous naval
strategists such as Mahan and Corbett.
As Wedin points out, this was not
always the case. The sheer immensity
of Castex’s work makes it daunting for
even the dedicated reader to digest. His
writing style was ponderous, considering
both the perspective of a practitioner
and that of a theorist, without privileging either. Finally, Castex modified some
of his views over the decades of authoring his volumes. Within that discourse,
though, there are numerous ideas in the
rough that are of interest to the modern
naval strategist and policy maker.
Wedin does a credible job of bringing
Castex into the new millennium,
showing where Castex was on-target, as
well as where his commentary does not
pass the test of time. Castex was accurate
on many things regarding the current
character of maritime competition and
conflict. His concept of strategy was not
limited exclusively to the use of military
power to gain political objectives during
time of war. Attention to the naval forces,
as well as the industry that built the ships
and the organizations that produced the
sailors to operate them, required oversight and direction during peacetime as
well. A strategy of morale was necessary
to keep the population committed
to the policies of the government—a
highly Clausewitzian notion.
As a practitioner, Castex wrote about
the notion of constraints that would
prevent military commanders from
taking extreme action in pursuit of mere
military aims. There were always limits,
both political and legal, that mitigated
such excesses, particularly in peacetime.
Failure of the national leadership to
maintain an interest in the maritime
environment in peacetime could lead
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to defeat in time of war. Instead, a
maritime strategy that coordinated
actions by industry, national military,
and security forces was essential to
build the wealth and power of the state.
These were still primarily wartime
concerns for Castex, for both the
preparation for and conduct during
hostilities, but he was prescient about
the growing importance of the linkages.
Yet Castex was not infallible, as Wedin
illustrates. The “infrastructuration”
of the ocean with new facilities to
gain wealth from the sea, such as oil
platforms, wind turbine farms, or
ocean floor mining, portends a greater
economic interest in the ocean above
and beyond that of shipping flows that
support the globalization of commerce.
This, of course, opens up different
avenues for disruption of the enemy
beyond the mere destruction of shipping
that Castex had observed in World
War I. Land attack from the sea, while
possible, did not seem likely to succeed,
perhaps owing to the poor Allied
performance at Gallipoli. Subsequently,
World War II showed that Castex was
too pessimistic on this subject. Castex
also underestimated the role of navies
in operations below the threshold of
armed conflict. The constraints of legal
regimes, such as the UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea, affect naval
operations in both peace and conflict
to greater degrees than Castex would
have believed possible. The maritime
component of strategy must now include
consideration of new strategies (cyber
and space) on the basis of technologies
that were nascent in Castex’s lifetime.
This hardly can be considered serious criticism of Castex, as the world
certainly has changed since he considered the foundations of naval strategy.
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For a readership well versed in the views
of British- and American-centric theorists and historical operations, this book
is a welcome exposure to other nations’
perspectives and conclusions regarding
the exercise of maritime power in peace
and war. Wedin is Swedish and Castex
was French, resulting in a distinctly
European view of sea power. Wedin’s
analysis of Swedish maritime policy in
light of Castex’s ideas is also valuable,
but this is not always an easy path. The
translation and organization of the book
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require the reader’s concentration. These
are surmountable obstacles in Wedin’s
efforts to bring Castex into the current
era and evaluate his strategic insights
for consideration by an already timeconstrained officer corps. He has done
the tough plowing of Castex’s work so
the main furrows have been established,
allowing in-depth analysis of the
particularly interesting spots in the field.
PAUL A. POVLOCK
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